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ABSTRACT 
Thi s  pape r extends our earl i er  work on dynamic mode l s  of R and 
D contracts  to a case  in which the f irm mus t  spe c i fy in e ach per iod of 
the contractual hor i z on a rese arch " targ e t "  which wil l govern payoffs  
in the next period. Targe ts may be " safe"  or  "ri sky . " By  defini t i on,  
the former are l e s s  than the f irm's exist ing s tock of  knowledge whi l e  
the l atter  exc e ed  i t .  W e  show that  the f irm i s  more l ik e ly to  do 
rese arch the l onge r  is the contractual hor i zon ( given a suitably high 
discount rate ) ,  the lower are research co s t s ,  and the higher i s  the 
l evel  of sponsor knowledge. Such parameter  change s a l s o  imply i t  i s  
more likely to  se t a r i sky targe t . W e  a l s o  e s t ablish a numbe r  o f  
re sul ts  r e la t ing changes  in  parame ters  t o  the optimal l evel  of s a f e  
a11d r i sky targe ts. Fina l ly ,  we analyze  the intertempor al relationship 
b e tween the target ing de c i s i on and incentive s  t o  do rese arch . 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TARGETING IN R AND D CONTRACTS 
Joel  Balbien and Loui s L .  Wilde 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a re cent art i c l e  in The Be l l  Journal ,  we ana lysed  the 
behavior of a singl e  firm engaged in R and D for a " sponsor" who was 
a s sumed  t o  b e  intere s t ed  in reducing the cost of some te chnol ogy 
( Balbien and Wilde , 1982 ) . The firm earne d a reward in e ach period of 
a mul ti-per i od contr actual rel a t i onship which was a funct i on of the 
current s tate  of sponsor knowledg e  and the new state  of sponsor 
knowledge  created  by the firm ' s  rese arch as reported  that period. 
However ,  i t  i s  often the case  that  a rese arch firm ' s payoff i s  based ,  
at l east  in part , on  some pre s e t  " target" l evel  of  pe rformance ( s e e  
e. g .  Murre l l ,  1 979 and Wei tzman, 1 980 ) .  A s  w e  noted  in our earl i e r
paper ,  the me thodol ogy deve l oped  therein  c an be  use d t o  study thi s  
more real i st i c ,  but more complex ,  c a s e .  I t  i s  our purpo se in th i s  
paper to d o  so . 
In our earlier  mode l ,  we as sumed the sponsor was interested  in 
l owering the uni t  cost  of some te chnology .  The index of performance 
was  thus taken to be costs--a lower index of performance was  preferred 
by the sponsor. Thi s  gene rated some nonintui tive no tation so  in th i s  
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mode l we as sume rese arch performance i s  repre sented in such a way that  
a higher  index of performance i s  preferred by the sponsor , The 
sponsor again contr acts  with a s ingl e  firm to engage in rese arch over  
a number  of  periods . At  the beginning of e ach per iod the firm 
inhe rits  a performanc e targ e t  ( a  fixed l evel  of the index )  tha t i t  
hope s  to  m e e t  b y  the end o f  the period. Thi s  targe t might repre sent , 
for exampl e ,  a reduction in expe cted  co s t  for some manufacturing 
proce s s  or the increased  po tency of an ant i-cancer  drug . The firm 
s e l ect s  a l evel of re se arch effort ,  conduc ts  rese arch, obs e rves  the 
( random) output of the re se arch proc e s s ,  and make s a report  to the 
sponsor . If the current target  i s  achieved a new target  i s  s e l e c t ed  
for  the next  period. The reported  l evel  of  pe rformance ( ne c e s sarily 
greater than or equal to the o ld  targe t )  b ecomes the new state  of 
sponsor knowl edge  for the next  period and provides a ba s e l ine for 
measuring further  advanc e s . 
We make a number  of s impl ifying a s sumptions  conc erning the 
_na ture of the rese arch proce s s  and the se t of admis sab l e  contracts. 
The re s e arch pro ce s s  i s  mode l e d  a s  random draws from a probabil i ty 
di s tr ibut i on define d over a range of pe rformance l ev e l s. The firm 
pays a fixed cost , c ,  and gets one draw from thi s  d i s tr ibut i on per  
period. I t  doe s ,  however ,  have the opt i on of not doing rese arch at  
all  if i t  so  de s ire s . The d i s tr ibut i on is  meant to  repre sent the 
firm ' s  expec ta t ions (po s s ib ly subject ive ) about rese arch po t ent ial. 
In princ ipl e ,  plac ing no part i cul ar s truc ture on expec ta t ions is ideal  
( Balbien and W ilde ,  1982 ) .  However ,  in thi s  case  there  are two 
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probl ems w i th taking a gene ral approa ch ,  Interviews with R and D 
eng ine er s sugge s t  they se ldom have a strong not i on of the shape of the 
distribut i on of rese arch po tent ia l , but feel  conf ident about its upper 
and l ower bounds . 1 Thi s  impl ie s  a uni form d i s tr ibut i on might be  the
most appropriate a s sumpt ion. Second ,  certain  t e chnical  prob l ems 
ar i se , further complicating the model , if  no s tructure i s  pl aced on 
expe ctat i ons . The se re l ate  to concav i ty of the various value­
func t i ons as socia ted with the dynamic  programming prob l em which 
characterize s  the f irm ' s  opt imal s trategy .  But even with uniform 
expectat ions over rese arch potent ia l  we wil l have to deal with some 
nonconcavit i e s .  That sharp re sul ts  c an be obtaine d  in spite  of th i s  
sugge s t s  some weakening o f  the uniform expe ctat ions i s  po s s ibl e ,  and 
we comment on th i s  in the conc lus ion ,  For notationa l convenience we 
normal i z e the di stribut i on de s cr ib ing expe c ta t ions over  rese arch 
potent i a l  to be  uniform ove r  [ 0 , 1] . 
Several as sumptions wil l a l so b e  made about the na ture of the 
rese arch contr act . First  i t  i s  a s sumed tha t  in any g iven period the 
f irm ' s  reward depends on ful fil lment of the current pe rformance 
targ e t ,  X. I f  that  goal i s  me t ,  then the reward i s  a function of the 
target and the current s tate  of sponsor knowledg e ,  a l evel  of 
performanc e ,  R. I f  the targ e t  i s  not me t ,  the f irm earns nothing in 
the current period and i t s  contr actual re l a t i onship with the sponsor 
is terminated. The firm earns no addi t i ona l bonus for repor t ing 
progre s s  beyond the targe t. One could pre sumably re l ax these  
as sumpt ions  to  inc lude bonuse s and penal i t i e s  of  the sort  cons idered 
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by Bonin ( 1976 )  and Weitzman ( 1976 ) .  
More formal ly ,  w e  l e t  the inst antane ous reward for ful fil l ing 
the current targe t be W (X , R) where X i s  the targ e t  and R is current 
sponsor knowl edge . It is na tural  to  a s sume that WX > O and WR > O . 
We al so  a s sume WXX < 0 and WRR < O. Fina l ly ,  there i s  the cros s
part ial  WXR. In our earl ier  paper  we a s sumed tha t  WXR > 0 ( se e
Balbien and W ilde , 1982 ,  pp. 109-10 for a di scus s i on of th is ) , but 
here we only ne ed WXR L O. Thi s a s sumpt ion imp l i e s  the margina l
return to  se t t ing higher pe rformance targe t s  doe s  n o t  fal l as sponsor 
knowledg e  increase s . 2
Our re sul ts f ocus on the firm ' s  inc entives t o  do rese arch and 
the na ture of opt imal targe ts . We def ine a targe t as ri sky if i t  
e�ceeds the f irm ' s  st ock of  knowledge and safe  if  i t  doe s not ,  In 
gene ral we have the fol l owing conclus ions. Regarding the firm ' s  
rese arch strategy ,  we show the f irm i s  more l ikely t o  do rese arch the 
l onger i s  the s equence of po tential  contracts  ( g iven an appropriately 
high di scount rate ) , the l ower are rese arch co s t s , and the higher i s  
the l evel  of  sponsor knowledg e . Such parameter  change s a l so imply i t  
i s  more l ikely to  se t a r i sky targe t ,  Thus , anything which induce s 
the firm to do more rese arch al so induces  i t  to se t ri sky targe t s  more 
often . Moreover ,  g iv en that the f irm se ts  a unique ri sky targe t ,  th i s  
target  i s  higher ( i . e .  l e s s  l ikely to b e  me t )  the l ower are rese arch 
cost s  and the higher is the st ate  of  sponsor knowledge . However ,  the 
r i sky targe t is independent of the l evel  of firm knowledge . Given 
that  the f irm se ts  a unique safe targe t ,  i t  reveal s more of wha t  i t  
s 
knows the higher are rese arch cost s ,  the l evel  of sponsor knowledg e ,  
or  the l evel  of f i rm  knowledge . Fina l ly ,  w e  ana lyze  the intertempor al 
rel at i onship b e tween the target ing d e c i s i on and inc entive s  t o  do 
research .  In part i cul ar,  we show tha t  if  there exi st  l ev e l s  o f  
private  knowl edg e  such tha t  the firm de s ires  to  do  rese arch when i t  
faces  a s a f e  targe t ,  then in s e t ting a s a f e  targ e t  opt ima l ly ,  i t  wil l 
a l so  int end t o  do rese arch . In  o ther  wor ds , in choos ing a targe t f or 
any period ,  if there exist  l evels of private knowledg e  and safe  
targe t s  f or which i t  wil l want to  do  research, then i t  wil l always do  
research the next period,  whe ther  i t  se ts  a safe  or a ri sky targe t .  
However ,  i f  no safe  targ e t  could ever induce the f irm t o  do rese arch , 
then i t  may or may not do rese arch , depending on whe ther  the opt imal 
targe t i s  r i sky or saf e ,  re spe c t ively . 
I I. '111E GENERAL MODEL 
Let Vt ( a , R, X) b e  di scounted  expe cted pro f i t s  from pursuing an
opt imal rese arch and targe t ing p l an when there  are t pe riods remaining 
in the f irm ' s  pl anning hor izon. The t ime index t represents  the 
number  of contr acts  the firm b e l ieves are avail ab l e  to  it i f  al l 
future targe t s  are met. The f irm ' s l evel  of privately he l d  knowledge 
at  the beginning of  the rese arch pe r iod is represented by a .  Again,  R 
i s  the l evel  of sponsor knowledge  and X i s  the targ e t  for the t ' th 
pe r iod .  In describing the firm ' s  optimal strategy ( in th i s  case  a 
choice  of whe ther  or not to do rese arch in the current period and a 
choice  of next period ' s targe t ) , i t  i s  use ful t o  d i s t ingu i sh be tween 
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two case s . In the first  a i s  l e s s  than X; the l evel  of privately he l d  
knowledge  yie l ds a performanc e l evel  which fal l s  short of the 
current ly activ e  target (pre sumably se t by the f irm in the previ ous 
period ) . In th i s  s i tuation the f irm mus t  e i ther  conduct rese arch or 
forfe i t  both the current reward and future contract  opportuni t i e s  on 
th i s  part i cul ar project . Thus for a < X,




[W (X , R) + E jJ 
Z2.X 
max Vt_1 (Z , X, x ) ] ( l-X)12.x2.X 
( 1 )  
The l o g i c  of  (1 )  i s  a s  fol l ows . I f  the f irm doe s  rese arch i t  incurs a 
cost  c .  I f  the outcome of i t s  rese arch, a random var iab l e  denoted  by 
Z ,  i s  l es s  than X ( the current ly active  targe t )  the firm get s  no 
reward and i t s  contr act  with the sponsor i s  not renewed . I f  Z 2. X
then i t  earns a reward for me e ting the current targe t ,  W (X , R) , and 
gets  to s i gn a new contract  which spe c i f i e s  a new targe t ,  x .  Of  
course x i s se t t o  maximiz e  Vt-l (Z , X , x ) . Note  that  the  new targe t is
s e t  after  the  random var iab l e  repre sent ing research output is  
observed .  Therefore the expe c ta t ion,  E, of  maximized di scounted 
prof i t s  when t-1 contracts  remain,  i s  evaluated  cond i t i onal upon  the 
outcome of the random performance variab l e ,  Z, be ing greater than or 
equal to  the current ly active  targe t ,  X. Current and expe cted  future 
re turns are mul tipl ied  by 1 - X = Prob {Z 2. X} s ince th is  repre sents 
the l ikel ihood of  mee t ing the current targe t .  Note  also that i f  Z 2. X
the f irm has the choice  of s e t t ing the new targe t at  a l evel  of 
performanc e e i ther  above ,  equal t o , or b e l ow its l evel  of private  
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knowledg e. The f irm wil l be sa id  to  se t a "ri sky targe t" if 
x > max {a,Z} ,  and a "safe targe t" if x � max {a,Z} .  
For a 2 X, the f i rm  can ful fil l the current targe t by drawing
upon  i t s  te chnol ogy inventory; i . e . ,  re s e arch is not compul sory. 
Thus, for a 2 X,
Vt ( a,R,X) max 
{-c + W(X,R) + EP max vt-l ( max {a,Z} ,X,x )l >x!_X 
( 2) 
W ( X,R) + p max Vt-l ( a,X,x )12x2X 
The f irst  term in ( 2) again reflect s  d i scounted expected  profits  when 
the f irm conducts  rese arch and then, depending on the re sul ts of  that 
rese arch, de c i de s  whe ther  to  se t a r i sky or safe  target . The se cond 
term ref l e c t s  expected  prof i t s  when the f irm doe s not conduct  new 
re s e arch in the current period and merely mee ts the current targe t 
"out of inventory," Neverthe l e s s, even in th i s  ca se  e i ther a ri sky 
target  or a safe  targ e t  may be s e t  f or the next contract, depending on 
a. 
In both ca s e s, the rel evant di scount rate i s  P s ( 0,1 ) .  
Equations ( 1 )  and ( 2) hol d  for t 2 1, For t = 0 we def ine
V0 ( a,R,X) = 0 for al l a,R,X . If  a > R there m ight be  some prof i t  to
the f irm from se l l ing the r e s idual information to  o ther private 
part ie s, but it is a s sumed that  pena l i t i e s  f or such act i on are so  
severe as to  e l imina te th i s  po s s ibi l i ty. 
One f ina l as sumpt i on important to a f irm ' s  targeting s trategy 
concerns whe ther  the sponsor wil l renew the f irm's contract  if  the 
research firm se ts a "safe  targe t" equal to the l evel  of sponsor 
J 
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knowl edge, i . e .  the f irm se ts X = R. Under one scenario, a sponsor 
might require that  a f irm demonstrate some minimal improvement in 
sponsor knowledg e  a s  a cond i t i on f or contract renewal. Such a po l i cy 
woul d encourage the se tting o f  ri sky targ e t s  when a f irm exhausted  i t s  
inventory of knowledge, but might l ead to  premature c anc e l l at ion o f  
rese arch projects  i f  targets  a r e  n o t  achieved .  An a l terna tive pol i cy, 
imp l i c i t  in equat i ons ( 1 )  and (2 )  p erm its  contract renewal when the 
f irm se ts  X = R. However W ( R,R) i s  s t i l l as sumed t o  be equal to  O . 
The formal  ana ly s i s  of th i s  mode l focus e s  on two aspe ct s  o f  a 
f irm ' s rese arch strategy over  a sequence of contracts: ( i ) a f i1111's  
choice  of rese arch e f fort in the current pe r iod a s  de termine d  by the 
f irm ' s  l evel  of private  knowledg e  at the beginning of the rese arch 
peri od, the l evel  of sponsor known performance at the beginning of the 
rese arch peri od, the currently active  targ e t, the cost  of re search, 
and the number  of remai ning contracts  in  which the f irm expe c t s  to  
part i c ipate; and ( i i )  the de c i s i on to  se t a safe  targ e t  versus a ri sky 
target  f or the next rese arch period as determine d  by the l evel  of 
privately known performance a t  the end of  the rese arch period, the 
l evel of sponsor knowledge at the end of the rese arch per iod, re se arch 
cost s, and again the l ength of the f irm ' s p l anning hor izon .  The 
ana ly s i s  proceeds recurs ively working backwards from the end of the 
hor i zon, i . e .  beginning wi th t = 1. 
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III . THE ONE-PERIOD PROBLEM 
As i s  apparent from se c t i on 2, the f irm ' s prob l em i s  qui te 
different when i t  inher i t s  a ri sky targe t as  compared t o  when it 
inherit s  a safe  targe t .  We cons ider the former f irst . 
3 a .  Ri sky Init ia l  Targets  
In thi s  case  a < X .  Thus the  f irm must  s imply dec i de whe ther
or  not to do  rese arch, and 
+ W (X,R) ( l  - X ){ -c 
V1 ( a,R,X) = max 
0 
( 3 )  
The f irm conduct s  research i f  and only if  W (X,R) ( l  - X )  ) c, 
Otherwise  i t  w i l l ing ly accep t s  z ero prof i t s  in the f ina l per iod, 
Lemma 1: W ( X,R) ( l  - X) i s  concave in X for XL R .  
The proof of  th i s  Lemma, and a l l  sub s equent resul ts, are  found in  the 
appendix .  Giv en Lemma 1, we can e a s ily characterize the se t of 
target s  for which the f irm doe s  rese arch . De f ine 
S1 ( c, R) {X I - c + W( X,R) ( l - X) < O}, 
and l e t  S1 ( c,R) b e  the comp l ement of S1 ( c,R) in [ 0,1 ] .
Figure 1 illustrates  S1 ( c,R) and S1 ( c,R) . I t  al so  il lustrates
that  no  rese arch i s  conducted  i f  X i s  near  0 or near  1 .  In  the l atter  
case  the l ike lihood of me e ting the current target i s  so  l ow that  i t  
doesn ' t  pay t o  try. In  the former the l ikel ihood of  mee ting the 
targe t  i s  high but the payoff i s  l ow . 3
Propos it ion 1: 
[Figure 1 about here ] 
( a )  s1 c c1,R) C s1Cc2,R) for c1 < c2,
( b )  s1 ( c,� ) C S1 ( c,� ) for R1 < R2 •
10  
Thi s re sul t shows that  when a f irm fa c e s  a ri sky targ e t  in  the f ina l 
rese arch per iod, the wor se the state  of sponsor knowledg e  ( i . e . the 
l ower is R) the more l ikely the f irm is to conduct rese arch , Thi s  
follows from the assumpt i on that the reward t o  the f irm for 
ful fil lment of the curren t targe t increase s a s  the difference b e tween 
sponsor knowledge and the current targe t increases  ( i. e . ,  
WR( X,R) < 0 ) .  Rai s ing R reduce s  the prof i tab i l i ty o f  conducting
rese arch without affecting the l ike l ihood of achieving the targ e t, As 
expected, Propo s i t i on 1 a l so  imp l i e s  that  the l ower the cost of 
re s e arch, the more l ikely the f irm i s  t o  conduct  rese arch . As can be 
seen in  Figure 1, increas ing the cost of rese arch decrease s the 
prof itabi l ity of conduct ing rese arch for a l l  l eve l s  of the performance 
target . 
G iven the def ini t i on of S1 ( c,R) we c an rewrite  (3 )  as{ -c + W(X,R) ( 1  - X )  
V1 ( a,R,X) =
0 
if  x s s1
if x s s1
3b . Safe Ini t ia l  Targets  
All tha t  remains in the one period problem is  the case of 
a 2 X .  Since V0 ( a,R,x ) i s  de fine d  t o  be  z ero, for a 2 X
( 4 )  
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FIGURE 1 
Definition of S(c,R) 
W(:X,R)(l-:X) 
x 
0 R t- i(c,R) -· 1 
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V1Ca , R, X) = W (X , R) . ( 5 )  
No rese arch i s  conducted  and a t  l ea s t  a l evel  o f  performance X i s  
del ivered t o  the sponsor . 
IV. 111E 1WO-PERIOD PROBLEM
The two period prob l em i s  r i cher than i t s  one period ana l ogue 
s ince the firm now se ts  an opt imal targ e t  f or the l as t  period ' s 
rese arch after  de c iding whe the r  to  conduct research during the se cond 
to the l ast  pe r i od .
From ( 1 )  and ( 2 ) w e  have for X > a 
[W (X , R) + E fl 
z2x 
max v1CZ , X, x) ] ( l-X )Xixil 
{ -c + 
v2Ca, R, X) = max 0 
and for X i a
V2 ( a , R, X) max 
{-c + W(X , R) + E fl max v1Cmax { a , Z} ,X , x )Xixil 
W (X , R) + max fl v1Ca ,X , x ) .Xixil 
Recal l that  the targ e t  f or the f inal period i s  se t after  
obse rving the  current period ' s rese arch output . The ana ly s i s  of  the 
(6) 
( 7 )  
two period prob l em begins by taking that  output as  g iven and e xam ining 
the targ e t  se tting de c i s i on of  the f irm as  a func ti on of  it . Thus we 
need to know more about V1(a,R,X) as X ranges over [R,1],
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4 a . Optimal Target ing 
S ince a L R or the f irm could not have survived the current
period, it has a choice  of se tt ing a ri sky targ e t  for the f ina l period 
(X ) a) or a safe  targ e t  (XS. a), In the l atter  case  i t  reveal s a l l  
i t  knows s inc e WX > 0 and v0 = 0, That i s, X = a if  .!!lJ[ safe  target
is se t ,  
I f  a r i sky target i s  se t ( X  > a )  then the f irm mus t  do 
rese arch in the f ina l period ,  Thus we def ine 
r2 argmax v1 ( a,R,X)R.$.X.$.1 
argmax W ( X,R) ( l  - X) - c, 
R.$.X.$.1 
( 8 )  
I f  r2 > a then the f irm ' s  opt imal ri sky targe t i s  r2 and i t  compares
thi s  targeting strategy to se tting X = a,  I f  r2 < a, though, the firm
wil l want to  se t r i sky targe ts  arb i trarily c l ose to a ( s ince 
W (X,R) ( l  - X )  - c is conc ave ) ,  In th i s  case se tting a safe targe t of a 
wil l domina te .!!lJ[ ri sky targe t  due to the fol lowing re sul t .
Lemma 2: W ( a,R) > lim W (X,R) ( 1  - X )  - c
X -?a 
G iven Lemma 2 we ne ed  only compare W ( a,R) to 
W( r2,R) ( l  - r2 ) - c ,
• 
Def ine x2 a s  the opt imal targe t in the two
period prob l em ,  Then 
if  W ( a,X) 2 W ( r2,R) ( l  - r2 ) - c
x
� 
= r r2 if W ( a,X) < W ( r2,R) ( l  - r2) - c
• 
Whe ther  x2 equa l s  a or r2 c l early depends on a . Hence we def ine
( 9) 
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{R if  c > W ( r2,R> Cl - r2 ) - W( a,R) for al l a L R
a2 = ( 10 )  
{ a l e = WCr2,R) (l  - r2 ) - W( a,R) } o therwise
Propo s i t ion 2: a2 i s  unique and wel l-define d ,  Furthermore, if  a2 > R
then ( i )  d;;2/dc < 0
( i i )  d;;/dR > 0
( i i i )  r2 ) a2 > R
Figure 2 il lustrates  a2 , For a <  a2,
• 
W( r2,R) ( l  - r2 ) - c > W ( a,R) so  x2 = r2, For a L a2,
• 
W( r2,R) ( l  - r2 ) - c S. W( a,R) s o  x2 = a ,
[Figure 2 about here ] 
Tha t a2 i s  unique ly def ine d  by c and R obtains because the
opt imal r i sky targ e t, r2, i s  independent of the f irm's l evel  o f
private knowl edge, a,  whil e W ( a,R) i s  increas ing in a ,  Propo s i t i on 2 
al so  shows tha t  the l ower the cost  of rese arch and the better  the 
s tate of sponsor knowledge, the more l ike ly the f irm is to se t a ri sky 
targe t for the f ina l rese arch period, The f irst  of the se  i s  obvi ous 
s ince a de c i s i on to  se t a ri sky targ e t  imp l i e s  that  research i s  
compul sory i n  the f inal period, and a l arger value o f  c makes th i s  
rese arch more co s t ly ,  The se cond obtains be cause a n  increase  i n  
sponsor knowledge  hurts  the f irm l e s s  under a r i sky strategy than a 
safe  strategy, hence at the marg in  i t  i s  more  wil l ing t o  engage in  
r i sky targe ting when R increase s, Fina l ly, we have rel ated re sul ts  on 
dr2/dR and dr2/dc,
FIGURE 2 












0 I , 11 I , , a ..,. / I  9\:. . .... 
-c 
I I 
_i. __ ..J_ ___ _ 
R a2 '2 
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Propo s i t ion 3 : I f  r2 s (a,1) then dr2/dR > 0 and dr2/dc = o.4 
16 
As the l evel  of sponsor knowledge increase s, the opt imal ri sky 
targe t f or the f inal period a l so increase s , Thus, as R increase s, not
only i s  the  f irm more l ike ly t o  se t a r i sky targ e t, but i t  se ts one 
which has l e s s  probabil i ty of being  me t .  Re se arch c o s t s  have no  
e f fect  on  r2 s ince  the f irm wil l have to  do  rese arch in  any case  when
i t  s e t s  a ri sky targe t and behavior in l ater  pe r iods i s  i rre levant 
s ince only one per i od remains. Thi s  re sul t wil l not  general i z e  to t > 
2. 
Fina l ly, we c an show that  whenever se tting a ri sky targ e t  
domina tes  se t ting a s a f e  targe t, the f irm wil l never  se t the ri sky 
targe t in such a way so as to wan t  t o  drop out of the contractual  
re lat ion ship i n  the l as t  period. 
Corol lary 1: I f  a < a2 and s1 # 0 then r2 s s1 (c,R). 
Thi s  resul t i s  immediate and i s  s t a ted  w i thout proof . I t  fol l ows 
because r2 i s  the maximum of W(X,R)(l - X) on [R,1]. 
- * 
Using a2 we c an rewri te  V1(a,R,x2) in a more us e ful form: 
* -
{W(r2,R)(l - r2) - c 
v1
Ca,R,x2) -
W(a,R) if a £ a2 
if a < a2 
These resul ts  a l l ow us t o  ana lyze  the two-period prob l em ,  
(11) 
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4b. Risky Initial Targets 
Using a2 we can rewrite (6) as 
V2Ca,R,X) 
a2 
,.1 {-c + W(X,R)(l - X) + 13f V1(z,X,r2)dz + f3j V1Cz,X,z)dz x -a2 
= max (12) 
0 
where a2 = a2(X) and r2 = r2(X); that is, the current target X becomes 
the level of sponsor knowledge in the final period. 
As in the one-period problem, we first characterize the set of 
targets for which the firm does research. Define 
a2 
,.1 s2Cc,R) = {X
i
e > W(X,R)(l - X) + 13
f 
V1(z,X,r2)dz + f3J V1(z,X,z)dz}, x -
a2 
and let s2Cc,R) be the complement of S2(c,R) in [0,1]. 
Proposition 4: (a) s2cc1,R) C s2cc2,R) 
(b) S2(c,�) C S2(c,�) 
(c) S2(c,R) C s1(c,R) 
for c1 < c2 
for �<R2 
The firm is more likely to do research when it faces a risky target 
the lower is c or R. Furthermore, it is more likely to do so when two 
research periods remain as compared to one. One more rewrite of (4), 
and thus (12), is possible: 
V2Ca,R,X) 
• r• + W(X,R) (1 - I) 
0 if x & 82 
0'
2 r1 + 13
J 
V1Cz,X,r2)dz + f3J V1Cz,X,z)dz x -
a2 
( 13) 
if x 8 82 
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4c. Safe Initial Targets 
In this case a L X, but we can't say whether a exceeds a2 or 
not. Thus (7 )  becomes 
V2Ca,X,R) 
{-c Sa * ,.1 * + W(X,R) + f3 V1(a,X,x2)dz + f3J V1(z,X,x2)dz 
0 a 
(14) = max 
W(X,R) 
Here 
* { y 
x2(y) = 
r2 
* + 13v1ca,X,x2) 
if y L a2 
if y < a2 
where y & {a,Z}. The issue is whether or not to do research, 
first term in (14) exceeds the second if and only if 
J
l * * 




Hence we define a "reservation level" of private knowledge, a2, by 








V1Cz,X,x2) - V1(a,X,x2)]dz for all a 
a 
r1 * * * f3J .
c






Proposition S: a2 is unique and well-defined. Furthermore, if a2 > 0 
(a) 
* 





dc < 0 
(c) da
;/
dX L o. 
* * 
If a < a2 then the firm conducts research, If a 2 a2 then it does 
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• 
not .  I f  a2 > 
0 then i t  i s  al so  greater than cr2 , the cr i t i cal  l evel  of
priv ate  knowl edge tha t  make s the f i rm  indif ferent b e tween se t t ing a 
ri sky ver sus a safe  targ e t  a t  the end of  the se cond t o  the l as t  
rese arch period .  Thi s  impl i e s  that  when the f i rm  enters  the se cond t o  
the l ast  rese arch period with a l evel  of  private  knowledge b e l ow the 
cutof f po int for setting a safe  targ e t ,  i t  always  conducts  rese arch 
hoping t o. avoid  the ne ed  to se t a r i sky pe rf ormance targe t f or i t s  
l ast  contr a c t ,  unl e s s  a l l  s a f e  targe t s  imply no  rese arch ( i . e .  
• * 
cr2 = o > , Hence i f  a2 > O, the equa t i on which def ine s  i t  reduce s  to
1 
c = 13f .cwc z , x>
a2 
* 
- W( G2 , X ) ]dz .
Propo s i t i on 5 al so  shows an increase  in sponsor knowledge or a 
de crease in res earch co s t s  wil l increase  the l ike l ihood the f irm 
. * 
conduct s  r e s ea1:ch . Fina l ly ,  the de f ini t i on of  a2 a l l ows  one more
rewrite of  (7) and hence ( 16 ) : 
a * 1 * 
( 17 )  
* 
0 a 
r• + W(X, R) + •f V1 ( a.X, xz'd• + •f V1 ( , ,x , x2ld• if a < a2
V2 ( a , R, X) = 
• * 
W(X , R) + �V1 ( a ,X , x2 ) if a L a2 •
A brief summary of th e two-period prob l em wil l be us e ful 
be fore  turning to the three-period  prob l em .  The f irm enters  the 
( 18 ) 
beginning o f  the se cond t o  the l as t  per i od with a st ock of  knowledge 
in  inventory , a current targ e t  and a g iven l evel  of sponsor knowledge . 
I f  the current targe t i s  ri sky i t  f irst  mus t decide whe ther  to do 
rese arch or drop out of the contrac tua l arrangement al toge ther. I f  i t  
20 
conducts  rese arch and mee ts the current targe t it mus t  then choo se a 
targ e t  f or the f ina l per i od .  Whe ther  tha t  targe t i s  r i sky or not 
depends on a cr i t i ca l  l eve l  of private  knowledg e ,  cr2 • I f  the current
targe t is s a f e , it must again de c i de whe ther  t o  do rese arch, but in 
thi s  case i f  it doe s  not ,  it is not f orced  to drop out .  Whe ther i t  
* 
doe s  rese arch depends on a rese rvat ion value of private knowledg e ,  cr2.
* * -
However ,  i f  cr2 > 
0 then cr2 > cr2 , so  that  the f i rm  always doe s  rese arch
when i t  s e t s  a s a f e  targe t unl e s s  a l l  safe  targe t s  imply no rese arch 




) • On the other  hand , if i t s  s tock of private  know ledg e
i s  such tha t  it  knows i t  wil l want to  se t a ri sky targ e t  in  the f ina l 
period,  then i t  ne ce s sarily conduc ts  rese arch during the se cond t o  the 
l a st  period .  Henc e ,  if there  exi st  l evel s of  private  knowledge and 
s a f e  targe ts  f or whi ch it wil l want to do rese arch in the l a s t  period,  
then the firm wil l always  do rese arch in the l as t  pe r iod. Otherwi se, 
whe ther  or not it does  rese arch is determ ine d  by whe ther  or not the 
opt imal i s  ri sky , respe c t ive ly, 
5. THE THREE-PERIOD PROBLEM
Now tha t  the f irm ' s rese arch strategy in the two-per iod 
prob l em ha s been ful ly charac terized ,  i t  i s  pos s ib l e  to cons ider the 
f irm ' s s e l e c t i on of  targe ts  and de c i s i on to conduc t rese arch when 
three or more pe r iods remain  in the pl anning hor i z on .  Thi s  prob l em i s  
more compl ica ted than the two-pe r iod ana l ogue b e c ause when t L 3 the
f irm ' s be s t  safe  targ e t  at the end of the pe r iod i s  not ne c e s sarily t o  
reveal  everyth ing i t  knows . Ins t ead the  f irm may have an  incentive  to 
temporarily withhold  some of i t s  private knowledge . Thi s  knowledge 
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inventory can then be depl eted  over  the remaining rese arch pe r iods s o  
a s  to  maximize  the ne t pre sent value of  prof i ts. A conse rvative
strategy of  se quentially se tt ing h igher  safe  performance target s  al so 
insure s  the f irm against the r i sk o f  los ing prof i t s  on remaining 
contracts  if it encounters  a bad draw from the di stribut i on over  
research potentia l. 
When t = 3 and a < X equa t i on ( 1 ) g iv e s  {-c + [W (X , R) + E Ii
V3 ( a , R,X) = 
O 
Z>X 
max V2 ( Z ,X , x ) ] ( l-X)X5.x.9 
and when a £ X equat i on ( 2 ) impl i e s
V3 ( a , R, X) = max 
{-c + W ( X,R) + E Ii V2 ( max { a , Z} ,X , x )XS,xS,1 
W (X , R) + max jl v2 C a ,X , x )XixS,1 
( 19 )  
( 20 )  
Anal ogous t o  the two-period prob l em ,  we begin by taking the 
output of the th ird to the l as t  rese arch pe r iod a s  g iven,  and exam ine 
the targ e t  se tting de c i s i on of the f irm as a func t i on of i t. Once the 
·targe ting de cision i s  ful ly characterized one can again back up to the
beginning of  the th ird to  the l a s t  rese arch per i od and embed  the 
solut i on to the two-period targeting prob l em in the three-per iod 
se tt ing, 
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Sa. Optimal Target ing 
The f irm ' s  objective  a t  the end of the th ird t o  the l as t  
re s earch period i s  to  choose a targ e t  for the next contract which 
maximizes  V2 ( a , R, X) , where a may be  knowledge hel d  in inventory or the
outcome of rese arch conducted in  the th ird to the l as t  rese arch 
peri od. Again ,  X i s a l l owed t o  range over  [R, 1 ] .  But a LR as wel l. 
Suppose  a > R. Then X a [R, a] i s  c a l l ed a safe  targe t and X a ( a , 1 ]  
i s  cal l ed a r i sky targe t. The two case s ne ed  t o  be cons idered 
separate ly . 
Consider  safe  target ing strategies. Def ine 
S3 argmax v2 ( a , R, X ) .RiXia 
( 21 ) 
As yet we know noth ing about v2 • In parti cul ar, i t  may not b e  concave
in XI Thus s3 may not be  unique and may not b e  interior to  [R, a] ,
Furthermor e ,  propert i e s  of v2 when a L X depend on where  a l i e s
• 
rel ative to  a2 and a2 • But when a L X, we do know tha t
a • 
V2 ( a , R, X )
{ -c + W(X , R) + Pf V1 ( a ,X , x2 ) dz -0 = 
CASE 1: 
• • 
W ( X, R) + pv1 ( a ,X , x2 ) if a£ a2
• a < a2 < a2
. . 
In th i s  case  a <  a2 s o, from ( 22 ) ,
1 • 
Pf V1 ( z , X, x2 ) dza 
• 
if a < a2
( 22 ) 
a 
V2 ( a , R, X) = -c + W (X , R) + Pf V1 ( a,X, r2 ) dz 0 
+ Pfa2V1 ( z ,X , r2 ) dz + PJ V1 ( z , X , z ) dz .a -a2 
But r2 i s  independent of the l evel  of private knowledg e ,  so for
z � a2,
v1 ( a,X , r2 ) = -c + W ( r2 ,X ) ( l  - r2 ) = V1 ( z , X , r2 ) .
For z 2 a2 ,
V1 ( z ,X , z )  = W ( z ,X ) .
Thus ( 23 ) be comes 
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( 23 ) 
� � . V2 ( a , R, X )  = -c + W ( X, R) + Pf [-c + W ( r2,x> < i-r2 ) J dz + PJ W ( z , X ) dz .0 -. a2
• S ince a2 and r2 depend on X, V2 ( a , R, X )  i s  independent of a for a < a21
• 
Thus i f  a < a2 , the se t of safe  targe t s  whi ch maximiz e v2 i s
independent of  a ,  as  i s  the maximized  value . 
CASE 2: • a2 � a < a2
In th i s  ca se V2 become s ,  again  from the f irst  branch of ( 22 ) ,
( 24) 
a2 a 1 
V2 ( a , R, X )  = -c + W (X , R) + pf V1 ( a , X, a ) dz + pf V1 ( a , X , a ) dz + pf V1 ( z ,X , z ) dz ,0 - a a2
or 
a 1 
V2 ( a , R, X) = -c + W ( X, R) + pf W ( a ,X ) dz + Pf W ( z ,X ) dz . ( 25 )  0 a 
Taking the derivativ e  of ( 25 )  with respect to a we have 
a
av2/aa = Pf Wx ( a , X ) dz = P ( l-a) Wx ( a ,X )  > o. 0 
24 
( 26 )  
Thus the se t of safe  targe t s  which maximize v2 depends on a and the
maximized  value of v2 increase s w i th a at  rate  P ( l-a) WX ( a , s3 ) for any




a2 < a2 < a .
I n  thi s  case , from the se cond branch of ( 22) , 
V2 ( a , R , X) = W (X, R) + pv1 ( a,X,a )
= W (X , R) + pW ( a ,X ) . 
av2/aa = PWx ( a , X )  > o. 
( 27 ) 
( 28 )  
Again ,  the se t o f  s a f e  targe ts  which maximizes  v2 depends o n  a
and the maximized  value of v2 increase s w i th a at rate  PWx ( a , s3 ) for
any one of them . 
Using these  resul ts  we can graph max V2 ( a , R, X) for X a [R, a]
as in f igure 3 , 
[Figure 3 about here ]  
Comparing (28 )  t o  ( 26 )  impl i e s  the s l ope  of max V2 ( a , R, X )
- . 
pos i tiv e  and greather  than that  on [a2 , a2J s ince WXR 2 O. 
• 
on [a2 , 1 1  i s
Cons ider next  r i sky target ing s tr ategi e s . Thi s app l i e s  to  
X > a so some care must  be  taken as X approache s a. When X > a we
0 
FIGURE .3 
Form of max v2(cr,R,X) for X £ [R,cr] 
max V2(a,R,x) 
I 
I I 0 
R - * a2 a2 1 





{-c + W(X, R) ( l-X)
V2 ( a , R, X) = 
a2 J + Pf V1 C z ,X , r2 ) dz + P V1 ( z , X, z ) dzx - if x £ 82a2 ( 29 )  
0 i f  X B 82
For x £ 82 , thi s  can be rewri tten as
V2 C a , R, X )
a2 
J = -c + W(X, R) ( l-X) + pf [-c + WC r2 ,X ) ( l-r2 ) 1 dz + p W( z , X) dzx -a2 
which. i s  c l e arly independent of a ,  Cons ider the form of V2 ( a , R, X) for
X a [R, l ] .  For now we ignore whe ther  X B 82 or X s 82 , and a s sume the
f inn always  conducts  research when i t  faces  a r i sky target , Figure 4 
il lustr ate s one po s s ib i l i ty for V2 ( a , R, X) a s  a function of  X. Note i t
, 
has  a unique g l obal maximum at r3 and a l ocal  maximum at r3•
[Fi gure 4 about here ]  
If  a < r3 then r3 i s  the opt imal ri sky targe t .
" 
I f  r3 .{ a < r3 then
" , 
the opt imal ri sky targe t  i s  not wel l-def ine d ,  i f  r3 .{ a < r3 , then the
, , 
opt imal ri sky target i s  r3 and i f  r3 .{ a .{ 1, then the opt imal ri sky
t,arge t i s  again not wel l-def ine d ,  Of conc ern here are the ranges  
[;3 , r; ) and [ r; , 1 1 .  If  a fal l s  in  these  range s ,  the optimal ri sky
targ e t  is arbi tr arily c l ose to a, But as soon as a i s  reached, the 
finn has  a safe  targe t ,  and v2 is given by ( 22 ) ,  not ( 29 ) .  It turns
out that in these  case s ,  a safe  targ e t  of a domina tes  al l ri sky 
( 3 0 )  
0 
FIGURE 4 
Example of v2(o,R,X) when 1 � X �Rand X > a
V2(a,R,X) 
1--�-'-��--'-�---����--�- x 
R 'f 3 r" 3 
I r3 1 
27 28 
s r targe t s , as the next Lemma shows. Here v2 and v2 refer to the value
func t i ons a s  def ine d  by ( 22 ) and ( 29 ) , re spe ctively ,  for safe  and 
ri sky targe t s. 
Lemma 3: l im V� ( a , R, X) < v; ( a , R, a) .
x �  
Lemma 3 i s  real ly qui te intui tive, I t  s imply imp l i e s  that  i f  
the f i rm  s e t s  a r i sky targe t o f  X when i t  knows only a ,  then i t  would 
be be tter  off  if  i t  actua l ly knew X and could se t a safe  targe t .  In
Figure 5 ,  V� (X , R, X )  is plotted  above V� ( a , R, X) , In tha t figure ,
[Figure 5 about here ]  
suppo se a i a • .  Then the opt imal ri sky targe t i s  r3 s ince
s r - • - s r -V2 ( a , R, a) � v2 C a , R, r3 ) .  But when a B ( a  , r3 ) ,  V2 ( a , R, a) > v2 C a , R, r3 ) ;
tha t  i s ,  when a B ( a ' ,;3 ) ,  i t  i s  po s s ibl e t o  se t a safe  targe t o f  a ,
- - II 
and thi s  domina tes  the opt imal ri sky targ e t  of r3 • When a B [ r3 , r3 ) ,
the opt imal ri sky targ e t  i s  not well-def ined ,  but 
s r V2 ( a , R, a )  > V2 ( a , R, X) for al l X > a, s o  again some safe  targe t i s
.preferred (po s s ib ly l e s s  than a ) .  On [ r; , a"] ,  an opt imal ri sky targe t
, I 
exi st s  ( r3 ) ,  but v; ( a , X , a )  again dominate s  i t, On
n HI r I s( � , a  ) ,  V2 ( a , R, r3 ) > V2 ( a , R, a) so  the ri sky targe t of r3 i s  both
well-def ine d  and preferred t o  a safe  targe t of a, Final ly, on 
"' 
[ a  , l ] , the safe  targe t of a domina tes  a l l  ri sky s trate g i e s ,  whe ther  
an  opt imal ri sky targe t i s  wel l-def ine d  or not. Figure 6 il lustrates
the form of the maximized value of  V� ( a,R,X) with respect to  X 2 a as 
a func t i on of  a for the s i tuat i on i l lus trated  in Figure 5. The heavy 
l ine represents max V� ( a , R, X )  where i t  i s  wel l-def ine d and the l ighter
FIGURE 5 
Example of safe versus risky targeting; safe is optimal for 
a £ [a' ,a"] and a £ [o"',l]. Optimal risky target is not well­
defined on [r3,r ) l and r 3 ,1 1 . 




l ine repre sent v; ca , R, a )  on r eg ions where i t  domina te s  a l l  ri sky
strateg i e s. 
[Figure 6 about here ]  
F i gure s  6 and 5 can  be  combine d  to  compare ri sky versus safe  
strate g i e s  a s  a func t i on o f  a .  Thi s  i s  done in Figure 7. Not i c e  that  
[F i gure 7 about here ] 
I 
max v; c an never cut max v; to  the right  o f  a s ince max v; ca, R, X) on
Xi a mus t domina te v; ( a , R, a ) . Thus there  exi s t s  a unique value of a
such that  the f irm i s  indifferent b e tween a ri sky targ e t  and a safe  
targ e t  unl e s s  safe  target s  are preferred  for al l a, We def ine th i s  
value a s  a3 , Figure 7 al so  il lustrates  that r3 2 a3 ) a2!
we have shown the fol l owing. Def ine 
The ref  ore 
{- s r a3 = R if  max v2Ca , R, X) 2 max V2Ca , R, X) for al l a
{ a l max v; ( a , R, X) = max v; ( a , R, X ) } o therwise
2 R 
Propos i t ion 6: a3 i s  unique and wel l-def ine d. Furthermore ,  i f
a3 ) R, then
where r3 min {X IX
( i )  d-;3/dc < 0 
( ii )  d-;3 /dR > 0 
( i i i )  r3 > a3 > a2
argmax V2 ( a , R, X ) } ,a<Xil 
( 3 1 )  
Up to  th i s  po int we  have s a i d  nothing about the uniquene s s  o f  
s3 o r  r3 e argmax V2 ( a , R,X)  for a ( X i 1 ,  N o  s imp l e  se t o f  condit ions
guarantee  e i ther  i s  unique or  that  r3 i s  even wel l-def ined.
Neverthe l e s s , a3 i s  unique and wel l-def ined. I f  a < a3 then the f irm
FIGURE 6 
· r s 











Definition of o3 
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s e t s  a r i sky targ e t  f or the se cond t o  the l as t  pe riod and i f  a 2 a3 i t
se t s  a safe  targe t for the se cond t o  the l ast  period .  Note that if  
a < a3 , then r3 must ne ce s s arily exi st! We  can  state  the fol l owing
Corol l ary to Propos i t i on 6 even though the prem ise may not hol d  f or
r3 • 
Coro l l ary 2 :  s 3 i s  unique and wel l-def ine d for a 2 a2• If  s3 a (0,a) 
and r3 a (a,l) then
( i ) dr3 /dc � 0 i ds3 /dc 
( i i )  ds3/dR > 0 and dr3 /dR > 0 
( i i i )  ds3 /da 2 0 = dr3 /da . 
The comparativ e  s tat i c s  g iven in Propo s i t i on 6 and i t s
Corol l ary can be summarized  a s  f ol l ows . A s  the c o s t  of rese arch 
increas e s ,  the f irm i s  � l ikely to se t a r i sky targe t .  I f  i t  doe s ,  
i t  genera l ly se ts  a l e s s  r i sky one . I f  i t  doe s  not ,  i t  reveal s .!!!!!!.!!. 
of what  i t  knows in a safe  targe t .  I f  sponsor knowledge  increas e s ,  
the f irm i s  .!!!!!!.!!. l ike ly to  se t a ri sky targe t and , i f  i t  doe s ,  the
targ e t  wil l be r i ski e r .  I f  i t  doe s  not se t a r i sky targe t i t  reveal s 
.!!!!!!.!!. of what i t  knows , Fina l ly ,  as the prviate  knowledge of the f irm
increases  i t  i s  more l ikely t o  se t a s afe targe t .  I t ' s  opt imal safe  
targ e t  a l s o  incre a s e s ,  so  tha t  i t  reveal s s ome o f  th i s  additi onal 
knowl edge , but its opt imal ri sky targe t i s  unaffected , Interest ingly , 
Corol l ary 2 a l so  shows s3 i s  uniquely def ine d  on any rel evant range of
a; that  i s ,  if  a < a3 then the firm se ts  a ri sky targe t; i t  only se ts
a safe  targ e t  if  a 2 a3 and in th i s  case  s3 i s  unique .
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Before cons idering the f irm ' s opt imal rese arch strategy in the 
three-period prob l em ,  a de c i s i on which is made prior to  the se l ec t i on 
of an opt imal targe t for the two-per i od prob l em ,  two further  i s sue s 
are of intere s t. The first  conc erns  our assumpt i on ,  made a t  the 
beg inning of  the ana ly s i s  o f  ri sky targe ting,  that  the f irm always 
conducts  rese arch in the two-pe riod probl em if  it faces  a ri sky 
targe t .  r We  know that  X B 82 if  and only if c ) v2 ( a , R, X) when a < X .
Referring t o  the exampl e o f  V� use d 'in the above di scus s i on,  Figure 8
illustrate s 82 and 82 •
[Figure 8 about here ]  
I t  i s c l ear from Figure 8 tha t  i f  V� i s  not concav e ,  82 wil l not
ne c e s s ar i ly be a conne ct ed  s e t. However ,  
min { r3 l r3
r - -argmax v2 C a , R, X)} s r3 B 82 as l ong a s  82 f d • As shownRiXil 
above , r3 i s  the cruc ial  ri sky targe t ( s e e  Propo s i t i on 6 ) . If the
f irm s e t s  a r isky targe t ,  i t  wil l b e  r3 , and r3 e 82 • Thus i t  wil l
never s e t  a r isky targe t a t  the end of  the th ird t o  the l as t  pe riod in  
such a way tha t  i t  w il l  want t o  drop out of the contractual 
relat ionship at the beginning of  the s econd to the l ast  period .  Thi s  
resul t i s  s tated  w i thout proof i n  Corol l ary 3 . 
Coro l l ary 3: I f  a < a3 and 82 f d, then r3 e 82 •
The se cond i ssue related  t o  the targe t se t t ing de c i s i on at  the 
end of the third to  the l ast  rese arch pe r i od concerns condit i ons under 
which the f irm se t s  a safe  targe t which reveal s all of its current 



















s.2 Cc,R) --� 
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I 1 
wel l-de f ine d  or i s  domina ted by a safe  str ategy .  To ana ly z e ,  th i s  
po s s ib l i ty ,  note that  s3 = a if  and only i f
av; c a , x,� 1 > o ax x = a 
But an exam inat i on of th i s  derivative in the three case s r e l evant to  
safe  targe t ing reveal s no apparent systema tic  behavior.6
Sb, Risky Init ia l  Targets  
Using a3 we  can  wri te ( 19 )  a s
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{-c + W (X, R) ( l-X ) + 
v3 (a , R, X) = max 
a3 1 
Pf V2 ( z ,X , r3 ) dz + Pf V2 ( z ,X , s3 ) dzx -a3 ( 32 ) 
0 
where  a3 
= 
a3 ( X ) ,r3 = r3 ( X )  and s3 = s3 ( z , X ) .  Here r3 c an be any
ri sky targe t  which maximize s  V� ( z ,X , r )  on r e ( a , 1 ]  •7 Again, the
ini t i a l  targe t, X, for the three-pe riod prob l em be comes the l evel  of 
sponsor knowl edge in the two-pe r iod prob l em ,  Def ine 
S3 ( c ,  R)
0"3 1 
{X i e > W (X , R) ( l-X) + Pf V2 ( z , X , r3 ) dz + pf V2 ( z ,X , s3 ) dz}x -03 
and l e t  s3 ( c , R) be the compl ement of s3 ( c , R) in [ 0 , 1 ] . The fol l owing
re sul t f ol l ows in an anal ogous fashion to Propo s i t i on 4 and i s  s t a ted  
without proof. 
Propo s i t ion 7: 
( a )  s3 ( c1 , R) C s3 ( c2 , R)
( b ) s3 ( c ,  !)_) C s3 ( c ,  �) 
( c )  s3 ( c,R) C s2 ( c , R) ,
for cl c2
for !)_ < R2
Again, l ower c o s t s  and a l ower l evel  of sponsor knowl edg e  encourage 
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the firm to conduct rese arch when i t  faces  a ri sky targ e t. S imil arly , 
i t  a l s o  f inds a l onger sequence of potent i a l  rese arch " sub-contract s "  
an  encouragement to do  rese arch when the current targe t i s  r i sky. 
Anal ogous to the two-per i od problem, ( 32 )  becomes 
{"
a3 1 
W (X, R) ( l-X) + Pf V2 ( z ,X , r3 ) dz + Pf V2 C z ,X , s3 ) dzx -
V3 ( a , R, X )
a3 ( 33 ) 
i f  X s S3
Sc: Safe Ini t ia l  Targets  
As i n  the two-pe r iod prob l em ,  we know a 2 X in thi s  case  but
whe ther  o exc e eds o3 or not is unknown. Thus ( 20 ) b e comes
if  x e s3
{-c + W (X , R) o * + Pf V2 [ a , X, x3 ( a)] dz +0 fl * P V2 [ z , X, x3 ( z ) ] dzV3 ( a  ,X ,  R)
where  
* 
X3 ( y, X )
max 
W(X, R) + PV2 [ o ,x , x; ( o ) ] .
{''"' = s3 ( y,X )  if  y 2. o3 (X ) .
if y < a3 (X )
0 ( 34 )  
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and ye {a,z}, The issue here is again whether or not to do research. 
The first term in {34) exceeds the second if and only if 
1 * • 
c < 13
f £
V2 [z,X,x3(z)] - V2 [a,X,x3(a)]}dz. 
a 
(35) 
A reservation level of private knowledge for the three-period problem, 
* 
a3, can thus be defined by 
* 1 • 

















Proposition 8: a3 is unique and well-defined. Furthermore, if a3 > 0 
then (a) 
• 





dc ( 0 
(c) da
;/
dX i. 0 
• * 
If a < a3 then the firm conducts research, If a 2. a3 then it does 
"' -
not. If a3 > 0 then it is also greater than a3, the critical level of 
private knowledge that makes the firm indifferent between setting a 
risky versus a safe target at the end of the third to the last 
research period. As in the two-period problem, if the firm enters the 
three
-
period problem with a level of private knowledge below the 
cutoff point for setting a safe target in the subsequent research 
period, it always conducts research, hoping to avoid the need to set a 
risky target in that period, 
"' 
Thus, if t 2. 2, and a3 > 0, the firm 
always conducts research if it doesn't pay to drop out. 
* 
If a3 = 0, 
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whether or not it does research depends entirely on whether or not it 
sets a risky target. Again, increases in research costs or decreases 
in sponsor knowledge reduce the likelihood of doing research. 
* 
Finally, the definition of a3 allows (33) to be written as 
V3(a,X,R) 




"' + J3V2 [a,x,x3(a)] if "' a L a3 
if 
One final result is of interest when t = 3. This concerns the 
"' * * • 
relation of a3 to a2• Proposition 9 shows a3 > a2 when the discount 
rate is sufficiently high so that the longer the contractual horizon, 
the more likely the firm is to do research when it faces a safe 
"' . 
target. Otherwise, a3 i a2• 
A * ) * ) A 
Proposition 9: There exists p3 e (0,1) such that a3 
( 
a2 if 13 
( 
133• 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The formal analysis this paper has dealt only with contractual 
horizons of t 
= 
1, 2, and 3. It is tedious but relatively 
straightforward to generalize the results to t 2. 4 .  We will not do 
so. The unique feature of the model from a technical point of view is 
that in spite of nonconcavities in the value functions for t i. 2, 
a number of strong results are possible, In particular, we have shown 
that an increase in the number of potential contracts increases the 
likelihood that the firm will set a risky target and makes it more 
likely to do research if it faces a safe target (the latter depending 
* 
a < a3 
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on a rel ativ ely high di scount rate ) .  I n  fact, any parametr i c  change 
which increase s the l ike l ihood that  the f irm wil l do rese arch wil l 
al so  incre ase  the l ikel ihood that  i t  se ts  a r i sky targ e t. Thi s  i s  an 
unintui tive resul t, espe c i a l ly for increase s in  the numbe r  of 
po tent ia l  contracts. To se e why i t  holds, suppose  the firm has a 
l evel  of private  knowledge a t  whi ch i t  i s  just indifferent b e tween a 
safe  and r i sky targe t. Let  the number  of remaining contracts  increase  
by one. I f  the f irm now se ts  a safe  targe t i t  wil l a l so  want to do 
rese arch in the next peri od. But i f  th i s  rese arch then increase s i ts 
stock of knowl edge i t  cannot capital i z e  on i t  unti l  another rese arch 
per iod pas se s .  Hence, at the marg in, it i s  wil l ing to incur some r i sk 
in order to capture part of the se po tential  gains one period e ar l i er. 
Thi s  argument holds a s  l ong a s  there  exist  safe  targ e t s  for which 
re se arch is de s irabl e. 
Of course our resul ts were a l l  obtaine d  under the a s sumpt i on 
that expe ctat ions over  rese arch potential  are uni form. Whi l e  th i s  i s  
a moderately strong a s sumpt ion, the re sul ts may wel l  hol d  for other  
distribut ions. Thi s  i s  l ikely to  be the case  because even wi th the 
uniform d i s tr ibut i on, the value functions for hor izons greater  than or 
equal to  two are not conc ave  in targe ts. That we were abl e  to  der ive 
our resul ts in  spite  of th i s  sugg e s t s  a caut i ous opt imism regarding 
gene ra l i z ations to nonuni form d i s tr ibut i ons. 
I t  i s  a l s o  po s s ib l e  to ana lyze other  as sumpt i ons regarding the 
payoff function W ( X,R) .  An a s sumpt i on that  WXR < 0 wil l not change
the b a s i c  qualita tive features of  the mode l, but wil l reverse  some of 
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the comparative  statics  resul ts and l eave o ther s  ambi guous. However, 
if WRR > 0, the f irm ' s  opt imal strategy c an be qui te different. In
part i cul ar, if  WRR i s  l arge enough ( and po s i t ive ) ,  the f irm pursue s  a
kind of "bang-bang" pol icy -- it  e i ther reveal s none of what i t  knows 
or everything. Thi s  al so  holds f or our earl i er  analy s i s  (Balbien and 
W il de, 1 9 82 ) .  
The more intere s t ing gene ral i zat ions, though, woul d introduce 
some degree of sophi s t i ca t ion on the sponsor s ide of the probl em, I t  
i s  the se  we intend to  pursue i n  future re search. I t  shoul d be po inted 
out that  the main i ssue from the sponsor ' s  po int of view i s  not 
mi srepresentation of resul ts per  se ( e i ther  through under-reporting 
safe  targ e t s  or over-reporting r i sky targ e t s ) ,  The sponsor i s  
interested  in  some overal l me asure  o f  project  bene f it s, and 
mi srepre senta t ion may be opt imal if it i s  a s sociated  with po s i tive 
incentives  to  do rese arch , Our partial  equi l ibr ium resul ts, both here 
and in  our e arl i e r  paper, sugge s t  th i s  might wel l be  the case. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1: Define f ( x ) = W (X , R) ( l  - X ) . Then 
f ' ( X )  = WX ( l  - X) - W ,
f" (X )  = W ( 1  - X )  - 2W xx x .
Hence f " ( X )  < 0 s ince WXX < 0 and WX > O. 
Proof o f  Lemma 2 :  I t  i s  trivial  that  
Q. E . D .  
lim W (X , R) ( l-X) -c = W( a , R) ( l-a) -c < W( a , R)
x� 
since c > 0 and 0 � a� 1 . Q . E . D .  
Proof o f  Proposit ion 1: The r esul t is trivia l  for change s in c .  For 
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change s  in R, note a f (X ) /aR = WR(X , R) ( l-X) < 0, whe re f ( x )  is de f ined
a s  in Lemma 1. S ince increase s in R decrease  f (X )  for a l l  X, they 
enl arge the se t of targe ts  for whi ch research does  not pay ( s e e  
Fi gure 1 ) . Q. E . D .  
Proof o f  Proposit ion 2 : The proof of th i s  propos i t i on is obvious f rom 
Figure 2 . The opt imal risky targe t ,  r2 , is independent of a ,  but
W ( a , R) is s t r i ctly increas ing in a .  Hence if a2 > R,  then it is
unique and wel l-def ine d and s trict ly l e s s  than r2• Taking the total
derivative  of c = W( r2 , R) ( l-r2 ) - W(
;
2 , R) with respe ct  to  
;
2 and c
give s  
d;2/dc = -1/wx <
;
2 , R> < o 
S imil arly. 0 = WR( r2 , R) ( l  - r2 ) dR - WX ( ;2 , R) d;2• Hence WXR 2 0 and- - - -
r2 > a2 imply 0 = WX ( a2,R) da2 + WR( a2 , R) dR or
da2 _ -WR( r2,R) ( l-r2) - WR( a2 , R) 
dR - - > o. Wx < a2 , R)
Proof o f  Proposit ion 3: By defini t i on ,  




dr2/dR = [ WR( r2 , R> - WXR( r2 , R) ( l-r2 > 1 / Cwxx < r2 , R) ( l-r2 ) - 2Wx < r2 , R) 1 .
But WXR i O. Hence dr2/dR > O. Cl early dr2/dc = 0, 
Proof of Propo s i tion 4: Def ine 
Q. E . D .
a2 J f2 (X )  = W(X, R) ( l-X)  + pf V1 ( z ,X , r2 ) dz + p V1 ( z , X, z ) dz .x -a2 
Part ( a )  fol l ows  triv i a l ly since f2 i s  independent of c .  To se e part
(b ) note that  a f2 ( X) /aR  = WR(X , R) ( l-X) < O. Fina l ly ,  part ( c )  fol l ows
s ince f2 ( X )  > f1 ( X ) , where  f1 i s  define d in Lemma 1 .  
Proof o f  Propo s i t ion S :  Def ine 
t . . H2 ( a ,X )  = p C V1 ( z , X, x2 ) - V1 ( a ,X , x2 ) ]dza 
• • • • 
where  x2 = x2 ( z , X )  and x2 = x2 ( a , X) , respe c t ive ly .





x2(y,X) = r2(X) if y � a2(X) 


















if a L. a2 
But 
V









W(z,X)-W(a,X)]dz if a L �2 
a 
Differentiating (A3) gives 




-jJ(l-a)WX(a,X) if a L. a2 
Furthermore, 
if a < a2 




by definition of a2• Also, H2(1,X) = O. Thus we have Figure Al. 
(A3) 
(A4) 
if a < a2 
[
Figure Al about here] 
• r1 -
Clearly a2 < a2 ( 1 for 0 ( c ( IJj_ 
[







dX take the total derivatives of 











c = /Jf [W(z,X) 
• 
a2 


























WX(a2,X)dz L. O, • 
a2 a2 
the latter since WRX L. O. Q. E. D. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Since the form of v
; 
depends on where a lies 
• 
relative to a2 and a2 we again need to consider three cases. 
• 
CASE 1: a < a2 < a2 
From (24) we have 
s 
V
2(a,R,a) = -c 
a2 
,;J. + W(a,R) +Pf [-c + W(r2,a)(l-r2)]dz + PJ W(z,a)dz, 0 -a2 















a2 r1 l im v;ca , R, X) = -c + W( a , R) ( l-a) + Pf [-c + W( r2 , a ) ( l-a2 ) ]dz + PJ W ( z , a) dz ,  ( A6 )x� a -
Cl early (A6 )  i s  l es s  than (AS) . 
• �: a2 �a ( a2
From ( 25 ) , 
s v2 C a , R, a )
a 
= -c + W ( a , R) + Pf W (a , a ) dz + 
= -c + W( a , R) + P�W( z , a) dz .
a 
PJWC z , a) dz 
a 
But a 2 a2 so  (A6 )  reduce s  t o
l im v;ca , R, X) = - c  + W( a , R) ( l-a) + PJW< z , a) dz .
x� a 
Cl early (A7) i s  greater  than (AS )  • 
CASE 3: • a2 < a2 i a
Here ( 27 ) g ive s  
s V2 ( a , X, a) = W( a , R) .
Thus , using (AS )  we ne ed t o  show 
or 
• 
W( a , R ) > -c + W( a , R) ( l-a) + PJWC z , a) dz 
a 
1 
c > Pf W( z , a) dz - W( a , R) a .
a 
But a 2 a2 impl i e s
1 




CAB )  
(A9 )  
(AlO ) 
S ince we are l e t ting X -7 a ,  thi s  imp l i e s  c > Pf W( z , a) dz ,  whi ch
a 
impl i e s  (AlO ) . Q. E . D .  
Proof of  Propo s i t ion 6 :  That a3 i s  unique and wel l-def ine d f ol lows
from the text . That  a3 < r3 where r3 i s  the m inimum of the set of
opt imal ri sky targe t fol l ows from the fact  that  max v; is increas ing
for a >  a2 • The partial  derivative s  can be  s i gne d by exam ining the
fol l owing derivative s . 
4 7  
For safe  targe t s  w e  ne ed  t o  consider av;/a c  and av;/aR  on
- . . 
range s  of a B ( a2 , a2 ) and a e ( a2 , 1 ) , case s 2 and 3 g iven in equa t i ons
( 25 )  and ( 27 )  in the text . Hence {-1 
av; ( a , R, X) /a c = 
O 
av; ( a , R, X ) /aR = WR(X, R)
• 
for a e ( a2 , a2 )
• 
for a e ( a2 • 1]
for a e < a2
, 1 1 .
For ri sky target s  we ne ed  only cons ider  equa t i on ( 3 0 ) , or 
(Al l )  
(A1 2 ) 
a2 r1 V� ( a , R, X ) = -c + W(X, R) ( l-X)  + Pf [ -c + W( r2 ,X ) ( l-r2 ) ]dz + PJ W( z , X ) dzx -a2 
Hence 
av� ( a ,R ,X ) /aR = WR(X , R) ( l  - X) (A13 ) 
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and 
a 
r 2 dr2 dr2 av2 ( a , R, X) /a c  = -1 + pfX [ -1 + WX ( r2 ,X ) ( l-r2 ) '""dc;"" - W( r2 ,X )'""dc;""]dz
da2 da2 + p [-c + W( r2 ,X ) ( l-r2 ) 1'""dc;"" - pw < a2 , x >'""dc;"" · ( A14 )
But (Al )  imp l i e s  WX ( r2 ,X ) ( l  - r2 ) - W( r2 ,X )  = 0 and the def ini t i on o f
a2 imp l i e s  - c + W( r2 ,X ) ( l  - r2 ) = WC�2 ,X ) . Hence (A14 )  i s  s imply
a2 r J 
-
av2 ( a , R, X) /a c  = -1 + p ( -l ) dz = - [ l + p ( a2 - X ) ] .x (AlS)  
Comparing (AlS)  to  (Al l )  we have for all X such that  they are def ine d,  
l av; < a , R, X> /a c l � l av� ( a , R, X ) /a c l
and 
l av2 ( a , R, X) /aR I 2 l aV� ( a , R, X) /aR I .
Hence d�3 /dc > 0 and d-;;3 /dR > O .  The se  same re sul ts  can be obtaine d  by
total ly different i a ting v; ( a , R, s3 ) = V� ( a , R, r3 ) us ing s ome se l ec t i on
A 
for s3 , say s3 = max { s3 1 s 3 argmax V2 ( a , R, X) } .l�X�a 
Q. E . D. 
Proof o f  Coro l l ary 2 : In  gene ral s3 i s  def ined by av; ca , R, s3 ) /DX = 0 
and r3 by aV� ( a , R, r3 ) /DX = O .  Cons ider first  case  1 in which v; i s
giv en by ( 24 ) . Here s3 i s g iv en by
a2 r1 Wx < s 3 , R) + Pf WR( r2 , s3 ) ( 1-r2 ) dz + PJ WX ( z , s3 ) dz = o .  (A16 )0 -a2 
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Hence 
a 
2 s 2 J 
2 
- [ a  v2 /ax ]ds3 = { p [WRX ( r2 , s3 ) ( 1-r) - WRC r2 , s3 ) J ( a r2/a c ) dz + [WR( r2 , s3 ) ( 1-r2 >0 
+ [WRC r2 , s3 ) ( 1-r2 ) - WC;2 , s3 ) ] ( a;2/ac ) } dc
I 2 s/ 2 But a r2 a c  = 0 ,  and a V2 a x  < 0 by the ne c e s s ary se cond order
condi t i on .  Al so ,  d;2/dc < O . Hence
I 
- - 2 s 2 ds 3 de = - [ WRC r2 , s3 ) ( 1-r2 ) - W ( a2 , s3 ) ] ( a a2/a c / C a  v2 /ax ) > O . 
In case s 2 and 3 ( equa t i ons 25 and 27 ) , s3 is c l early independent of
c .  Furthermor e ,  taking a2v;/a x2 in ( 25 )  and ( 27 )  shows v; i s  concave
for a L a2• In these  case s s 3 i s  unique ly def ine d .
For r3 w e  use equation ( 3 0 ) . Different ia t ing w i th re spe ct  t o
X give s  
Wx < r3 , R) ( l-r3 ) - W( r3 , R)
a2 r1 + Pf WRC r2 , r3 ) ( 1-r2 ) dz + PJ WR( z , r3 ) dzr -3 a2
-p [-c + W( r2 , r3 ) ( 1-r2 ) 1 = 0
a s  the equat i on whi ch define s  r3 • Hence
or 
2 r 2 - -- ( a  V2/ax ) dr3 = { p [WR( r2 , r3 ) ( 1-r2 ) - WR( a2 , r3 ) ] ( a a2/a c ) } dc ,
I 
- - 2 r  2 dr3 de = -P CWRC r2 , r3 ) ( 1-r2 > - WRC a2 , r3 ) J ( a a2/a c > / C a V2/ax ) .
But we know from Propo s i ti on 2 tha t  r2 > a2• Hence
(Al 7 )  
s o  
WR<
;
2 , r3 ) � WR( r2 , r3 ) ( 1-r2 ) < O. Thi s  impl i e s  dr3 /dc i O . 
For change s  in R, we have  from ( 17 )  that  
2 r/ 2 - ( a  V2 ax ) dr3 = [WXRC r3 , R) ( l-r3 ) - WRC r3 , R) ]dR
or 
dr3 /dR = - [WXRC r3 , R) ( l-r3 ) - WR( r3 , R> 1 / < a
2v�/ax2 > > o . 
For s3 , ( A1 6 )  g iv e s ,  i n  case  1 ,
2 s/ 2 - c a v2 a x  ) ds3 = wXRc s3 , R) dR
or 
ds 3/dR = -wXRc s3 , R> / c a
2v;/ax2 > > o (Al 8) 
In ca se s  2 and 3 ( equa t i ons ( 25 )  and ( 27 ) , we ge t re sul t s  identi ca l  t o  
(Al 8) . 
For change s  in a we a lready know r3 is independent of a .  For
s3 , it is apparent (A16 )  is independent of a .  In case  2 , ( 26 )  implie s
I 2 s/ / 2 s/ 2 ds 3 da = - c a  v2 a aax > c a  v2 a x  >
= -p ( l-a ) WXR( a , X) / ( a sup [ 2V; /ax2 > > o , 
and in case  3 , ( 28 )  imp l i e s  
ds3 /da = -pWXR( a , s3 > / c a
2v;/ax2 > > o . Q. E . D .  
Proof of Propos i t ion 8: Def ine 
1 
� ( a ,X )  = Pf C V2 C z , X, x2 ( z ) ]  - v2 c a ,X , x2 C a) ] dza 
• where x2 i s  def ine d a s  in  the text fol l owing equa t i on ( 33 ) .  Us ing
those def ini t i ons , 
5 1  
a3 r1 ·Pf C V2 ( z , X, r3 ) -V2 ( a , X, r3 ) ] dz + J {V2 C z , X, s3 ( z ) 1 -V2 ( a ,X , r3 ) J dz
� ( a ,X )  
a -a3 
IPJ {V2 C z ,X , s3 ( z ) 1 -V2 Ca ,X , s3 ( a) ] } dz if a 2 a3 a 
where r3 i s  any opt imal ri sky targe t ( e . g .  r3 ) and s3 i s  the unique
safe  targ e t .  
But r3 i s  independent o f  a for a <  a3 ( and f or z < a3 ) .  Hence
aH3 C a , x> /a a  = 
{o if a < a3
av2 av2 ds 3 . -PJ C-a;;-C a ,X , s3 ) + ax-< a ,X, s3 } �] dz 1f a 2 a3 •a 
Now if s 3 ( a} < 0 then av2/ax = 0 evaluated  a t  ( a , X, s3 > . I f  S3 ( a) = a ,
then ds 3/da = O . Hence
aH3 ( a ,X ) /a a  = 
if  a < a3{o
l av2 -pf a;< a , x , s3 ) dz
a 
if a L a3 
But av2/aa > 0 evaluated a t  ( a , X, s3 ) when a L a3 • Moreover ,
( A1 9 )  
-
if  a < a3
� ( l ,X )  = 0 ,  Thus H3 ha s the form il lustrated  in Fi gure A2 .  
[Figure A2 about here ]
• • 
Thus a3 i s  unique and wel l-define d .  Furthermore ,  a3 ) a3 , That
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• • 
da3 /dc < 0 and da3 /dX L 0 fol l ow from different ia t ing c = H3 ( a ,X ; c )  in
the usual fashion. Q. E . D .  
Proof of  Propo s i t ion 9 :  We know from Propo s i t i on 6 that  a3 ) a2 •
Moreover ,  H2 ( 1 ,X )  = 0 = H3 ( 1 ,X ) > Hence i f  we can show
( * ) A l aHz < a ,X ) /a a l  ) l aH3 ( a ,X ) /a a l  on a s C a2 , 1 1 a s  P ( p3 we are done .
( See  Fi gure A3 )  
[Figure A3 about here ]  
For  a > a3 > a2 , from ( A4 )  we have
and from ( A1 9 )  
aHz < a , X> /a a = -p ( l  - a) WX ( a , X) ,
1 av2 alig ( a ,X ) /a a  = -pf a;< a , X, s3 ) dz .a 
But s3 > X s ince X i s  the new s t a te of sponsor knowledge . Furthermore
s3 i s  a safe  targe t and on a > a2 ,
2 aH3 ( a ,X ) /a a  = -p ( l-a) WX ( a , s3 ) .
Thus l aH2 C a , X) /a a l  < l aHg ( a , X> /a a l f or a s [ a3 , 1 1  i f  and only if
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a2 CJi "3 03 1 
PWx( a , s3 > > WX ( a , X) .
But s3 > X imp l i e s  WX ( a , s3 ) > WX ( a , X ) . Thus i f  p i s  s uf f i c i ently
c l ose to one we have 
. . .,. 
PWx( a , s3 ) > WX ( a , X ) , 
and a3 > a2 • If p = p3 where  
.,. 
p3 = WX ( a ,  s3 > 
. . .,. . . 
a3 = a2 • Otherwise , if P < p3 , a3 < a2 • Q. E . D .  
5 4  
5 5  
F001NOTES 
l ,  In Balbien ( 1981 )  cost  e s t imates  f or parabol i c  d i sh power systems
as  e l i c i te d  from Jet  Propul s i on Laboratory R and D eng ine ers  are  
typical ly found t o  have concave or convex di stribut i ons , However ,  
l ater fol l ow up interviews deal ing with physical  performance 
character i s t i c s  (base d on engine ering e f f i cienc i e s )  yielded 
e s t imates  whi ch were almost  always uniform . The se  l atter  
e s t imates  were reported  in  an unpub l i shed JPL interna l  memo .  
2 , The cruc ia l  as sumpt i on i s ,  surpri s ingly , WRR < O.  See  the
di scus s i on on page 110  of Balbien  and Wi lde ( 19 82 ) . 
3 . The se t of targets  f or which the f irm doe s  rese arch ha s a s imp l e  
struc ture in the one pe r iod prob l em ,  The gene ral def ini t i on thus 
s eems  spe c i ous . However ,  as the l ength of the hor i zon increa se s ,  
the value func t i ons are not ne ce s sarily quas i-concave , Thus 
S t ( c , R) may not b e  connec t ed  when t > 1 .  We start  w i th a gene ral
notat ion in  order to be cons i s t ent throughout the pape r .  
4 .  Cond i t i ons which guarantee r2 i s  an interior maximum are s imil ar
to those  stated  in Balbien  and Wi lde ( 1982 ) .  See  footnote 8 ,  page 
112 . Again ,  Lemma 2 i s  an obv i ous resul t .  We state i t  formal ly 
in order to maintain cons i st ency with more compl icated  ana l ogue s 
when t > 1 .  See f ootnote  2 .
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S. Condi t i ons whi ch guar antee s3 and r3 are interior maxima are again
simil ar to those stated  in  Balbien and Wilde ( 1982 , footnote  8 ,  
page 112 ) .  
6 .  Once the f irm reache s a s i tuat ion where no safe  targe t ever 
induces  it to  do rese arch, i t  wil l never  again do rese arch . In 
thi s  case it s t i l l may not wish to  reveal al l i t  knows 
immediately . However ,  prior to thi s  po int i t  may reveal al l i t  
knows i n  a parti cul ar pe riod ,  do  rese arch the next period ,  and 
wi thhold  s ome of i t s  new knowledge . 
7 ,  There  i s  no real  probl em with nonuniquene s s  o f  r3 from the f irm ' s
per spe c t ive--al l yie ld  i denti ca l  expe cted  payoff s ,  Formal ly some 
se l e c t i on is required but as  the di scus s i on a s soc iate d  with 
Propo s i t i on 6 showed,  r3 = min { r3 } i s  the na tural one .
57 
REFERENCES 
Balbien,  Joe l .  "Probabil i s t i c  Cost  S tudy o f  Solar D i sh Power 
System s , '' Jet  Propul s ion Labor atory , Pasadena , Cal i fornia ,  March 
1 9 81 . 
Balbien,  Joe l and Loui s L .  Wilde , "A Dynamic  Mode l of Research 
Contr acting , " The Be l l  Journal of Economic s , vol . 13 ( Spring 
1 9 82 ) , pp . 1 07-11 9 .
Bonin, J . P . , "On the Des ign o f  Managerial  Incentive S tructures  i n  a 
Decentra l i z ed  Pl anning Env i ronment , " American Economic Review ,  
vol . 6 6  ( Sept embe r  1 97 6 ) , pp . 6 82-6 87 . 
Murrel l ,  P . , "The Perf ormance o f  Mul tiper iod Managerial  Incentives 
Scheme s , "  American Economic Review, vol . 69 (December  1 9 7 9 ) , pp . 
93 4-940 . 
Wei tzman, M . L . , "The New Sovie t  Incentive Mode l , "  The Be l l  Journal o f  
Economic s ,  vol , 8 ( Spring 1 9 7 6 ) , pp . 2 51-25 7 . 
----- • "The ' Rat che t Princ ipl e '  and Performance Incentiv e s , " The 
Be l l  Journal of Economics , vol . 1 2  ( Spring 1 9 8 0 ) , pp . 3 02-3 0 8 . 
